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Introduction 
The question of whether an auditor can remain indep~dent when they provide 
," 
Management and Advisory Services (MAS) to its clients has been investigated in 
professional, governmental, and academic literature. The purpose of this study is to 
explore the conclusions that are drawn from each of these communities and provide a 
cross analysis of the stances that each body presents. In section two, I present the various 
forms of the definition of auditor independence. In section three, I introduce the history 
of the auditor independence question including the pivotal Metcalf Committee 
investigation (1976). In the fourth section, I characterize the stance of the United States 
government on this issue. In the fifth section, I similarly characterize the accounting 
profession's stance. In the sixth section, I describe current relevant academic research in 
order to test whether or not it is addressing the issues important to the profession. The 
seventh section provides my conclusion to this study and my recommendations for the 
future of academic research in this area. 
Definitions of Auditor Independence 
The realization of a single definition of auditor independence has so far evaded 
the academic, professional, and governmental communities. Presently the Independence 
Standards Board (lSB) is researching various definitions from the different communities 
in an effort to compile a working definition for this purpose. My intention for 
introducing a definition of auditor independence is to provide an exposure to this 
controversial topic and to illustrate the qualities that are being considered in reference to 
auditor independence. 
Academics have attempted to define auditor independence using sophisticated 
models and intuition. DeAngelo (1981) reasoned auditor independence should be 
described as the ex ante value of the audit to consumers. She estimated this value as the 
"perceived ability to (1) discover errors or breaches in the accounting system, and (2) 
withstand client pressures to disclose selectively in the event a breach is discovered" (p. 
113). DeAngelo concluded based on her model of audit 'low balling' that "the level of 
auditor independence is defined as the conditional probability that, given a breach has 
been discovered, the auditor will report the breach". 
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Antle (1984) addressed the profession's failure to arrive at a single definition of 
auditor independence. Antle claimed that although both the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICP A) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have regulations requiring auditor independence, the lack of a single definition has 
been a source of controversy. Antle further remarked that the entire debate of auditing 
firms continuing to provide MAS rests on whether these services impair the quality of 
audits. Finally Antle's inquiry used a game-theoretic principal-agent model that 
describes auditor independence and the strength ofthe relationships between the auditor 
and the owner. Antle created his model around verification, which he considers the 
essence of aUditing. He defines independence in terms of "an auditor's resistance to 
managerial pressure or interference". 
Other academics have attempted to define auditor independence. Magee and 
Tseng (1990) define independence as "an auditor's making reporting decisions consistent 
with his or her beliefs as to whether the reporting decision may be regarded as an audit 
failure" (p. 317). Magee and Tseng further expand by claiming "an auditor compromises 
his or her independence when he or she allows the client to use a reporting policy that he 
or she believes would be viewed as an audit failure" (p. 317). 
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Finally the ISB cites Penno and Watts definition from "An Independent Auditor's 
Ex Post Criteria for the Disclosure of Information" (Supplement 1991). They describe 
auditor independence as follows. "[I]fthe auditor's preferences over disclosures depend 
neither directly on management's wishes nor indirectly on management's preferences (for 
example, through future audit fees), one could say that the auditor is 'independent' (ISB 
Append. C)" These definitions represent a few of the many attempts by academics to 
define auditor independence, but are limited based on the issues looked at. 
The ISB provides a careful examination of the various definitions of auditor 
independence in its "A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence" (2000, 
Append. C). The ISB stresses the definition that results from its work should result from 
the most thorough viewing of the goals of auditor independence. The ISB arranges the 
numerous examples of goals it provides into one of two categories. These two categories 
are broken into goals related to financial statement reliability (or independence in fact) 
and goals related to the perceptions, credibility, and confidence (also known as 
independence in appearance). Relying on these two sources of goals, the ISB then 
categorizes the definitions it is considering into one of five groups. These groups 
comprise of definitions based on (1) a personal attributes approach; (2) an activities and 
relationships approach; (3) a focus on perceptions, credibility, and confidence; (4) a 
multidimensional approach; and (5) the academic approach. 
At the time of this study, much deliberation by the ISB has gone into defining the 
term auditor independence. While a definitive conclusion has not been reached, the ISB 
has narrowed its search to twelve definitions before the finalization of the conceptual 
guideline. The ISB concludes their discussion of definitions of auditor independence by 
offering a final comprehensive definition including all of the components considered 
important. This definition states "Independence is freedom from pressures and other 
factors- indicated by certain activities or relationships- that may impair, or may be 
perceived to impair, the willingness of auditors, both individually and as a group, to 
exercise appropriate personal attributes (including objectivity and integrity) when 
performing an audit" (p. 95). The ISB's comprehensive definition offers the most 
extensive consideration given to the issue of defining auditor independence. 
A History of Auditor Independence 
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The issue of auditor independence for firms that offer non-audit services has 
historically been an area of concern. The United States Congress, the SEC, the Public 
Oversight Board (POB), the AICPA, and academics have each taken turns studying the 
issue (Panel, 2000). In 1932, some of the earliest forms of concern over the auditor 
independence issue began to surface. The AICPA questioned whether they should 
provide regulations stating that an auditor could not be an officer or director of clients 
and then concluded that these regulations would be unnecessary. This did however 
initially raise the point of independence in appearance for the profession to see. The 
Securities Acts of 1933 first described what the SEC would consider to be a lack of 
auditor independence. They considered it a breach of independence ifthe auditor served 
as an officer or director, or had any direct or indirect interests in public clients. The goal 
of the SEC's definition was to achieve independence in appearance as well as 
independence in fact. In 1941, the AICP A adopted and expanded this rule to include all 
clients of auditors instead of solely publicly traded clients. 
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In 1947 the AICP A issued a statement that recognized the expansion in the scope 
of services auditors were beginning to provide. While this statement did not specifically 
address the issue of auditor independence, it presented the first time anyone looked at the 
expanding horizons that were evolving in the profession. The statement specifically 
looked at tax advice, accounting assistance, advice to businesses in the installation of 
accounting and cost systems, budgeting, and internal controL The AICP A statement 
suggested that these practices had evolved from requests of audit clients for additional 
services that were natural for auditors to be knowledgeable about. A second point of note 
presented in this statement was the argument that providing these services increased the 
auditor's knowledge of the firm it was auditing and allowed them to conduct better 
audits, thereby increasing the value of the auditor's opinion. The Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness extrapolated this statement by stating that the evolution of specialty skills 
into consulting practices, including MAS services, was a logical extension of the auditing 
practice. 
The Wheat Committee (1971), the Trueblood Committee (1971), and the Cohen 
Commission (1974) represented the profession's attempt to take an introspective look at 
its own practices. These committees looked at the standard setting polices adopted by the 
profession and identified issues associated with these procedures. Until 1975, accounting 
practices were generally left up to the accounting profession, which consisted of a 
hierarchy of organizations including the AICPA (Table 1). At the end of 1975, and 
throughout 1976, a subcommittee of the United States Senate lead by Senator Lee 
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Metcalfundertook a rigorous study of the accounting profession and the Federal 
government's role in establishing accounting practices. In a letter to the Chairman ofthe 
Senate Government Operations Committee, Abraham Ribicoff, Senator Metcalf claimed 
that a series of corporate failures and financial difficulties had brought the attention of the 
Senate upon these issues. Senator Metcalf also stated the major purpose of the 
subcommittee's inquiry was to provide Congress and the investing public with 
information regarding the role of private organizations and the Federal government in 
setting and administering accounting practices. Senator Metcalf asserted that a 
comprehensive look at such an important issue had been long overdue and that interest in 
the subcommittee's work by the accounting profession, the academic community, and 
Federal agencies indicated that the value of this study was enormous and would be 
instrumental in the regulation of accounting. 
The Metcalf Committee began its report by first looking at the firms, specifically 
the largest in the United States, then known as the "Big Eight". This exploration of the 
firms concluded that there was little evidence supporting that the firms were able to serve 
the public effectively or were even independent in fact. The subcommittee specifically 
alleged that MAS went beyond the rational scope associated with accounting practices 
and that the firms were breaching auditor independence. The subcommittee went on to 
describe some of the important qualities of the independent auditor stating that the 
independent auditor was required to agree with the accounting methods their clients 
utilized and to certify the accuracy of the client's records. The subcommittee maintained 
that requiring the position ofthe auditor as independent in appearance and independent in 
fact was the cornerstone of the profession and the only goal worth achieving. The 
subcommittee advocated that strict adherence to independence in appearance and 
independence in fact was the only way to restore confidence in the profession. The 
subcommittee alleged that the "Big Eight" had seriously impaired their independence 
with their involvement in MAS. 
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The Metcalf Committee concluded its discussion of the private organizations used 
for establishing accounting policies by alleging that the "Big Eight" were able to 
influence the AICP A, the organization with the most control in setting standards for 
accounting policies. The subcommittee justified this rationale by claiming that the 
AICP A was organized in a way that permissively allowed the "Big Eight" to influence 
and control its power structure. With control of the AICP A, the "Big Eight" firms were 
able to justify any policy that would lead to the selfish goal of increasing revenues 
through MAS services. The subcommittee aggressively maintained the "Big Eight" 
controlled a circular pattern that began with the "Big Eight" controlling the AICPA and 
ended with the "Big Eight" being able to select accounting methods that benefited their 
clients. This pattern suggests that the "Big Eight" were able to control the decision of 
which practices were allowed. The subcommittee argued that this freedom provides a 
motive for a breach in auditor independence, if not independence in fact then certainly in 
appearance. In an attempt to restore public confidence in actual independence the 
committee provided a list of sixteen recommendations. At the core of these 
recommendations was the idea that the Federal government become more involved in 
establishing accounting procedure goals and objectives as well as standards, thereby 
reducing the power of the "Big Eight" firms. 
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The release of the extensive Metcalf Committee report provided a source of 
discussion throughout the next two decades. The first to respond to the allegations were 
the "Big Eight" firms, many who were outraged by what they felt was slander of their 
work. Most of the firms released pUblications disputing the findings of the committee's 
report. Arthur Young's "Professional Responsibilities in a Time of Change" was a sixty-
five page example of such a publication. This compilation included an in depth view of 
what Arthur Young saw as the problem and the challenge, as well as direct responses to 
each of the Metcalf Committee's suggestions. While the report granted that the 
committee was correct on some aspects, it criticized and dismissed much of what the 
Metcalf suggested. 
Throughout the 1980's, academics attempted to address the issue of auditor 
independence, drawing much of their motivation from the Metcalf Committee. Linda 
DeAngelo started the decade with her classic work "Auditor Independence, 'Low 
Balling', and Disclosure Regulation: A Summary" (1981). While DeAngelo's paper did 
not specifically address the issue of MAS's effect on auditor independence, she did 
examine 'low balling', a phenomenon many consider to be a precursor to the auditor 
independence problem. 'Low balling' occurs when initial audit fees are set below the 
initial cost incurred to provide the audit. This paper seemed to springboard research into 
the MASI auditor independence issue and was one of the most cited works in MAS 
research. 
Other academics explored auditor independence in search of examples that would 
lead to a definite breach of auditor independence. Simunic (1984) compared clients' 
audit fees for those who employed MAS from the auditor with those that did not. 
Palrnrose (1986) conducted a similar study in order to reinforce Simunic's findings. 
Beck, Frecka, and Solomon (1988) took a specific look using an empirical study at 
auditor independence and MAS and concluded that auditor independence is never 
substantially impaired by MAS services. 
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The continued debate over the findings of the Metcalf Committee was not limited 
to academics by any means. Lee Berton, a journalist, followed the auditor independence 
debate for firms who provide consulting in his articles for the Wall Street Journal. In his 
article "Consulting for Audit Clients: A Conflict ofInterest?" (1987), he addressed the 
issue of the growing dollar amount of fees being collected by the "Big Eight" firms for 
MAS services and also voiced some of the complaints made by others in the consulting 
practice. Later Berton covered inquiry of the SEC on the auditor independence issue in 
his article "SEC Is StUdying Independence of Firms Doing Consulting and Accounting 
Work" (1989). Berton's work represented a renewed interest by the public in, what 
seemed to be, an ongoing battle between the "Big Eight" accounting firms and the 
government. 
While the professional firms were quite busy defending the endless stream of 
allegations from critics, they funded various areas of research in support of their stance. 
Pany and Reckers (1988), funded by Peat Marwick, maintained that the provision of 
MAS had little or no impact on audit decisions and claimed that the auditor still remained 
independent in fact. The study also defended the history of the auditor independence 
debate, mentioning that all studies until 1988 had concluded that there may be a problem 
of independence in appearance, but there never seemed to be a problem of independence 
in fact. 
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In the late 1990s and early into the 2000s, the SEC began to take a renewed 
interest in the auditor independence issue. The escalation of fees collected for MAS and 
the expansion of services offered spawned an in depth investigation and an increasing 
importance placed on independence. Discussions between the AICP A and the SEC lead 
to the formation of the ISB, as well as the Public Oversight Board creating the Panel on 
Audit Effectiveness. The SEC then asked the ISB to formulate a conceptual guideline for 
auditor independence, including a discussion on MAS, which at the time of this study 
was still under review. This tentative guideline, along with the Panel's findings, served 
as a beginning point for an all out SEC investigation on the issue of aUditing firms 
providing consulting. The Panel stood divided on the issue of auditing firms providing 
non-audit services. In their report, they brought together a list of conclusions from both 
sides in order to fully represent the breadth of the issue. 
Recently the SEC has undergone an investigation in order to consider the 
adoption of three regulations regarding auditor independence. The first two are related to 
investments made by auditors and employment relationships regarding clients. The third 
specifically looked at the scope of services offered by auditing firms. The regulations are 
based on proposed principles that would provide enduring guidelines on auditor 
independence. These four principles require that the auditing firm not: "( 1) [have] a 
mutual or conflicting interest with the audit client, (2) audits his or her own firm's work, 
(3) functions as management or an employee ofthe audit client, or (4) acts as an advocate 
for the audit client" (Proposed Revision Summary). These regulations provide a general 
standard that is based on the commonly accepted idea that auditors must be independent 
in appearance as well as fact. The SEC is also reviewed nine non-audit services for 
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clients that are inconsistent with auditor independence, seven of which are already 
outlawed by the AICP A or the SEC. These activities are bookkeeping or other services 
related to the client's accounting records, financial information systems design and 
implementation, appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions, actuarial services, 
internal audit services, management functions, human resources, broker-dealer services, 
and legal services. 
The SEC has commissioned the testimonies of expert witnesses from every facet 
of the accounting profession in order to provide a revealing and all-inclusive view of the 
problem and the popular opinion. Many of the head partners of the "Big Five" firms 
were called upon to provide testimony to the commission, as well as the head of the SEC, 
and international accounting experts. Many have provided stories or arguments over 
various facets of the profession in order to sway the commission. Currently the SEC has 
adopted the polices considered, but more can be expected in the future oftheauditor 
independence debate. 
The United States Government's Perspective on Auditor Independence 
After the completion of the Metcalf Committee's report, the government seemed 
'. 
to waiver over their stance on the auditor independence issue. Senator Met~'alf clearly 
indicated he found that the practice of MAS provided a breach of auditor independence 
and that many changes would be required in order to repair the state of the accounting 
profession. In particular, Metcalfhad two major concerns. the first ofthese was based 
on the hierarchy of the accounting establishment. Metcalf and the members of his 
committee felt the private sector of the accounting professiC!n had entirely too much 
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control regarding policies and disclosure. The second concern the Metcalf committee 
presented was the lack of independence by the profession as well as a seemingly lack of 
dedication by the biggest public accounting firms to adjust their policies to reinforce their 
position against the perceived lack of independence. 
These concerns lead to a series of sixteen recommendations by the Metcalf 
Committee to the U.S. Government. They recommended that Congress exercise stronger 
control over the accounting profession by establishing comprehensive accounting 
objectives for the Federal Government to guide agencies. The recommendations also 
specifically stated that the Federal Government needed to "restore public confidence in 
the actual independence of auditors ... by promulgating and enforcing strict standards of 
conduct for such auditors" (Metcalf, p. 22). Metcalf called for restricting any activities 
that may be viewed as a breach of independence in fact or appearance and also explicitly 
attacked direct or indirect representation of clients' interests as well as any non-
accounting MAS and further recommended that the SEC take charge of this mission. 
After the allegations ofthe Metcalf Committee, the Federal Government began to 
take an increased interest in the auditor independence issue. Throughout the 1980s the 
public followed the concern over the auditor independence issue as consulting fees began 
to take on an increasingly larger percentage of accounting firms revenues. Wall Street 
Journal reporter Lee Berton quoted Michael Barrett, chief counsel for a House 
subcommittee, as stating that there exists a "serious question as to whether accounting 
firms should do any consulting work for audit clients" (Berton 1987). Barrett also went 
on to state that a breach of independence in appearance caused the profession to suffer as 
" 
much damage as a breach of independence in fact and created a black eye on the 
profession. 
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In 1989 the SEC launched a six-month investigation on whether or not consulting 
services impaired auditor independence. This investigation was spawned in an effort to 
"ease some of the conflict-of-interest rules for auditors in joint ventures with clients" 
(Berton 1989). John Riley, associate chief accountant of the SEC, stated, "To us, doing a 
fairness opinion on mergers and some corporate restructuring obviously impaired an 
outside auditor's independence" (Berton 1989). While Riley's comment was pointed at a 
specific example of Arthur Andersen providing the valuation of assets, the study spanned 
all non-accounting services. Riley further commented that the U.S. government was not 
concerned with the firms providing these services, but stressed the services should only 
be provided for non-audit clients. 
One ofthe primary reasons for the U.S. Government's continual interest in the 
auditor independence issue is the avid push by other professionals who are protecting 
there own interest by claiming that an impairment of independence exists. Berton argued 
the most common source of complaint over auditor independence seemed to come from 
other non-accounting professional firms. While many professionals in these firms 
seemed to be voicing valid complaints, a common concern for lost business erupted from 
the slew of opinions that were voiced. Ettore Barbatalli, chairman of the Valuation 
Research Corp., commented that five years prior, his firm had lost little or no clients to 
any of the large CPA firms. He claimed to be losing "up to four clients a month" further 
commenting that he felt that "it's a conflict ofinterest for the auditor to tell his clients 
that his CP A firm is the most qualified for a consulting job" (Berton 1987). A survey of 
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one thousand businessmen, financial analysts, bankers, attorneys and academics noted 
that there existed a growing trend towards professional belief that CPA firms were 
impairing their independence by offering non-accounting services. In Berton's coverage 
of the auditor independence debate, he reported that non-accounting services provided by 
the largest CPA firms were starting to infringe on investment bankers territory for merger 
and acquisition clients. This was a major factor for yet another Congressional 
subcommittee hearing, in what were becoming regular events for Congressional inquiry. 
Near the end of 2000, the SEC provided and passed a proposal that attempted to 
modernize the auditor independence requirements in three primary areas. The SEC 
hoped to be able to provide the profession with definitive regulations regarding non-audit 
services and to ultimately end the auditor independence issue. Consistent with the 
recurring argument, the regulations prescribed would only apply to incumbent auditors 
and MAS providers. In order to provide this a solution to this problem, the SEC decided 
to undergo a comprehensive investigation that included testimony and input from 
governmental, academic, and professional experts. 
One component utilized by the SEC was the Panel on Audit Effectiveness. The 
Panel prepared a report based on a review and evaluation of audits conducted on publicly 
traded financial statements. The Panel included an auditor independence component and 
discussion in order to assist the SEC. While the Panel provided excellent feedback on the 
auditor independence issue, the Panel remained split when it came to its stance on 
whether there was conflict and how the SEC should approach it. Instead the Panel 
summarized arguments for both sides to be used suggestively in helping to persuade the 
SEC's decision. 
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The Panel, however, did agree on a number of issues. These issues were "(1) 
Independence is essential for promoting public confidence in the audit process, and must 
be monitored continuously, (2) so long as auditors provide non-audit services to audit 
clients, there will be at least an issue with respect to the appearance of independence, (3) 
there has been an explosive growth in non-audit services in recent years, to the point 
where many large firms' revenues from these services exceed their audit revenues, (4) in 
their zeal to emphasize the array of services that CP As offer, audit firms and the AICPA 
scarcely acknowledge auditing services in the public images that they portray. This 
serves to exacerbate the independence issue and to downplay the importance of auditing" 
(POB 115). 
The proponents for issuing a ban excluding the practice of non-audit services 
provided a set of guidelines in order to determine which non-audit services would not be 
acceptable for an audit firm to practice. MAS were argued to be conflicting to the role of 
the CPA. They further argued the basis for this debate and the source of the conflict 
rested on whom the CPA was representing. Audit services rely on the representation of 
the general investing public, while all MAS seem to advocate the clients' interest. The 
proponents of the exclusionary ban warned that use of a case-by-case scenario of non-
audit services in order to determine which MAS were acceptable would be 
disadvantageous because of the amount of time spent on narrowly defining what practices 
are authorized. The proponents felt an exclusionary ban would be most effective because 
it rewarded firms that were already sensitive to the auditor independence issue and placed 
them on the same competition field as other auditors. The exclusionary ban would also 
be a low cost alternative for the government to regulate. Finally, the proponents 
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commented that disclosure of non-audit services would not be effective today or in the 
future. The proponents claim the investor will not be able to synthesize the information 
correctly and that since auditing services are profitable today as well as in the future, 
there is no reasonable argument to not having independence in fact and appearance. 
The opponents of a ban that excludes the practice of non-audit services argued 
that such a rule would not be beneficial and would therefore hurt the auditing practice. 
They believe the audit practice has survived this long without such a rule, that there is no 
need for one now, and further remain confident that audit committees, management, and 
auditors are able to make acceptable decisions regarding their own independence. The 
main arguments presented for their case concern the issue of the client having to decide 
whether they would like one firm to be an auditor and another as an MAS provider. The 
opponents also feel the different representation of management and the investing public 
are not usually at odds with one another. The opponents claim the auditor independence 
responsibility is a normal business responsibility and a handy rule to simplify this is not 
necessary. Auditors are increasingly utilizing specialists in their line of work and are 
able to rely on the experts within their own firm. This also allows for intellectual growth 
in that auditors are now able to broaden their own knowledge. The panel concluded by 
recommending to the SEC and ISB to continually evaluate any method of disclosure 
requirements the SEC found suitable. 
Included in the SEC testimony was a speech from Arthur Levitt, Chairman ofthe 
SEC. The Chairman seemed to voice the opinion of the U.S. Government within his 
short but elaborate speech. Levitt proclaimed the role of the CPA as a public defender 
and a distinguished profession that should not weaken their reputation in order to make 
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extra profits in an already lucrative profession. Levitt further asked the commission to 
remember the ethics and responsibility given to the auditor and to enact the ban on non-
audit services. His speech seemed to promote the stance taken by the U.S. Government 
since the Metcalf Committee. The U.S. Government has always taken a more 
conservative stance on the auditor independence issue than has the profession. 
Wall Street Journal reporters Weil and Tannenbaum (2001), wrote an article that 
was released in the midst of the attempts by the U.S. Government to provide a finalized 
solution to the auditor independence issue, once again returned to the professional 
concern of increasing non-audit service fees collected by large accounting firms. The 
authors questioned the SEC policy of public disclosure by companies who utilize these 
services when the auditor also provides audit services. Weil and Tannenbaum also 
reported immense pressure from industry wide support forced the SEC to back off its 
original position, which was to ban MAS from being provided by the auditor. This 
provides further evidence of the ongoing inability of the U.S. Government to provide a 
stance that is agreeable to all sides of the auditor independence issue. 
The Profession's Perspective on Auditor Independence 
During the compilation ofthe Metcalf Committee's report the profession 
attempted to find answers to its own questions about the auditor independence issue. The 
Cohen Commission (1974) examined the provision of non-audit services in conjunction 
with the role of the auditor. The commission points out that total independence can never 
occur in a practical world and that attention should be placed on the amount of 
independence needed to make the financial statements useful to society. The commission 
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further states that no evidence of a breach of independence has ever been brought to light, 
but that a significant belief that an impainnent exists would affect the entire industry by 
questioning the value of audits. After conducting a comprehensive survey and discussion 
with many professionals, the Cohen Commission detennined that a change in the 
regulatory policies regarding MAS was not needed, and that interference would cause 
more damage than good. 
After the release of the Metcalf Committee's report, the profession responded 
with scathing publications in order to voice their stance. The finns felt that Metcalf had 
unfairly characterized their position as well as misinterpreted many of the positions they 
saw as problems. In particular Arthur Young published a direct response titled 
"Professional Responsibilities in a Time of Changes" that defended the firms on several 
pointed issues. Arthur Young stated that although they believed they had never entered 
into collusion or conspiracy with any parties, "the Staff study sometimes suggests, and 
sometimes specifically charges, that we have done all these things" (Arthur Young, 1). 
Arthur Young specifically implied there was a fault of over reliance on Abraham Briloff 
in the Metcalf Committee's study, whom they believed actually embodied the minority 
opinion on a great many issues. Arthur Young also took great offense at the implication 
all auditors that worked in the largest finns are not independent. The finn stated "the 
profession is grounded in carefully considered concepts of independence, public service, 
and public interest and is guided by a substantial and comprehensive ethics code which 
causes members of the profession to avoid even the appearance of conflicts of interest 
and to maintain their objectivity" (Arthur Young, I). 
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Another issue Arthur Young addressed specifically was the provision of MAS. 
The finn dissented with the Staff study suggestion that these services are inherently a 
violation of independence. They claimed the provision MAS to audit clients is a natural 
component of the auditing function, citing examples of helping a client create a more 
effective and efficient set of internal controls, record-keeping procedures, or methods of 
accounting for various transactions. The finn further claims that these improvements 
benefit society by creating better accounting systems for management and for the use of 
accountability in organizations which not only is more economical, but also more 
beneficial to the shareholder. The finn also stated that prohibiting auditors from 
providing these services denies society from benefiting from this specialized expertise 
that should be capitalized upon. Finally the finn criticized the Staff study for failing to 
provide evidence that the provision of MAS did indeed contribute to the failure of audit 
perfonnance. 
Berton reported on the profession's stance as it avidly defended its position on 
the auditor independence problem. The profession stated that independence is a 
foundation and cornerstone of the entire profession and that no finn would risk this 
professional responsibility for the sake of profit. The profession placed independence in 
fact over independence in opinion and, as Berton (1987) described, have effectively 
constructed a Chinese wall between aUditing and consulting. Then managing partner of 
Arthur Andersen, Duane Kullberg, claimed that the auditor independence issue existed 
only as a red herring and that the public should focus more on how to make auditors more 
useful to the public. Kullberg further conceded that the auditor independence issue 
presented a "conflict-of-interest appearance problem" but the critics using this argument 
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"complain about unfair competition [and] are really complaining about competition" 
(Berton 1987). Robert Mednick, managing partner for Arthur Andersen, also fought 
passionately on behalf of the profession. Mednick claimed on behalf of the firm that "we 
believe the SEC is unfair imposing a U.S. standard to the rest of the world" when it came 
to the MAS question (Berton 1989). 
During the SEC's intensive investigation to determine a final solution to the 
auditor independence issue, a number of members of the profession were called on to 
voice their opinion to the SEC. The proposal made by the SEC was harshly criticized by 
the AICPA as well as many others in the profession. Much ofthe profession felt that the 
rules were put together in haste and were flawed. The firms claimed that the 
restructuring due to an exclusionary ban of MAS offerings would result in the loss of 
competencies in non-audit professionals and that firms would have great difficulty 
recruiting top accounting students without the ability to increase the intellectual quality of 
the work. Two of the "Big 5" firms, Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
claimed to be generally supportive of the SEC's rulemaking initiative with both firms 
going so far as to sell off their consulting services. The rest of the "Big 5" claimed more 
revision had to be made to create effective rules. 
Steven Butler, chairman ofKPMG, claimed in his testimony that investor 
protection was the key to his organization, but that the SEC's proposed restrictions would 
"irreparably damage auditors' ability to protect investors" (Butler 2001). Butler further 
claimed that two effects would become evident upon adoption of the proposal: the 
profession would no longer be able to attract the best and brightest students and the new 
rules would reduce the profession's ability to meet clients' needs and also provide 
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effective audits. Butler warned that the dawning of the information age had forever 
altered the profession and forced the firms to keep up with the demand of the clients. 
Butler argued that the profession relied on the changing practice ofthe profession to 
recruit and keep employees intellectually engaged. The information age also made it 
difficult to compete with technology and start up firms for new employees coming out of 
college. Butler concluded with a remark that "non-audit service restrictions would hurt 
our clients by increasing audit costs while threatening audit quality and limiting client 
choice" (Butler 200 I). 
James Schiro, CEO of Price waterhouse Coopers (PWC), expressed PWC's 
concern by stating that the SEC had a stronger duty to complete with these proposed 
regulations. Schiro urged that rather than attempt to define and ban any unacceptable 
non-audit service, the regulating body should attempt to create rules that would protect 
the future as well as the present. Schiro claimed that no one could know what MAS 
would be demanded ten years from now and that rules needed to be created that would 
grow with the times. Schiro declared the main objective ofthe public accountant is to 
protect the public interest, but that auditors could only do this by recognizing new 
challenges within the aUditing process. Schiro dismisses the popular opinion that quality 
audits cannot be conducted if MAS are prohibited and further recognizes that while rules 
created for the United States market may not fit neatly into other cultures, the SEC should 
give special consideration to rules that provide a global impact. Schiro also claims that 
excluding MAS from public accounting firms would not harm the job market because 
recreating the auditing model to fit these new regulations would still provide interesting 
and challenging work. 
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The statement of Thomas Goodkind, a CPA that has worked in the auditing 
profession for nearly six busy seasons, presented the opinion of the smaller firm auditor. 
Goodkind took a stance very similar to that of Arthur Levitt, playing up the role of the 
auditor as a public defender. Goodkind advocated the adoption ofthe proposal in order 
to preserve the integrity of the profession and claimed the AlCPA requires independence, 
in not only fact, but also appearance. Goodkind feels this guideline is the correct one to 
follow and should be preserved throughout all of the proposed changes for the sake ofthe 
investing public. Goodkind addressed the argument of MAS providing higher quality 
audits by inquiring if audits really need to be strengthened in such a manner and if so, 
couldn't they be strengthened in such a way that didn't raise any conflict? Goodkind 
claims the larger accounting firms are being greedy by offering these services. He 
specifically states "the primary motivation of an auditor should be to insure that the 
financial statements that the client prepared are materially correct, [and] should not be to 
offer extra services to their client no matter how lucrative" (Goodkind 2001). 
The SEC didn't exclude foreign testimony from their all-inclusive questioning. 
Graham Ward spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom in order to voice one of the many 
global opinions ofthe impact these regulation changes would make. Ward agreed with 
the objective of strengthening auditor independence but felt certain principles needed to 
be emphasized. Ward quoted a leading UKjoumalist as stating, "Principles encourage 
compliance. Regulations encourage deception" (Ward 2001). Ward complimented the 
SEC on taking a conceptual framework approach to the issue, stating this design should 
be easily adaptable and coping. Ward did, however, remind the SEC of several potential 
problems with the proposal. Ward reiterated that there is no evidence of significant 
," 
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breaches of auditor independence. Ward also claimed the argument that provision of 
MAS created economic dependency on the client was inherently flawed. Ward believes 
that the company being audited has the choice of auditor as well as the price they would 
like to pay. Ward suggested a limit be placed on the fees that could be realized outside of 
audit services in order to side-step this problem of appearance. Ward further claims that 
trying to prohibit some MAS and allowing others will not work very long because ofthe 
constantly changing business environment. Ward also claims prohibiting firms from 
accepting MAS from auditors is not in the best interest of the public, because the firms 
will have to settle for less knowledgeable advice. Ward concludes by claiming a revamp 
ofthe auditing model may cause the profession to lose some of its most qualified people 
and he urges the SEC to consider adopting similar policies to those adopted by other 
international accounting bodies. 
Weil and Tannenbaum's (2001) Wall Street Journal article seems to sum up the 
profession's stance. Al Andersen, senior vice president at the AICP A, claims the debate 
is unnecessary because the AICP A has always "felt the investor could make informed 
decisions when there is disclosure [of non-audit services performed" (WeB and 
Tannenbaum 2001). The "Big 5" maintain that independence is unaffected by the 
provision of MAS and several firms have already spun off or sold their consulting 
practices in the face ofthe SEC's campaign. George Ledwith, a spokesman for KPMG, 
claims "it's nonsensical to think that we'd jeopardize any audit relationship or put our 
independence at risk for the sake of other business" (Weil and Tannenbaum 200 1). 
Spokespeople from GE and Motorola, both clients ofKPMG, attest the reasons they use 
KPMG's non-audit services are based on knowledge and value. Larry Parnell of Ernst & 
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Young maintains the volume of non-audit services sold attests to the quality of work 
being provided by the large finns. Deborah Harrington of Delloite & Touche argues that 
it is ridiculous to think large accounting finns don't take their independence seriously. 
She claims the accounting profession has too long a history and reputation to risk for the 
sake of a few dollars. Weil and Tannenbaum's article seemed to sum up the profession's 
maintained stance on the auditor independence issue. 
The Academics Perspective on Auditor Independence 
Academics have long searched for a theory providing evidence of a possible 
breach in auditor independence. Various methods have been used in attempts to explain 
the rational behind the different arguments for the auditor independence issue. Methods 
utilized include empirical research, experimental markets, and game theory principal-
agent analyses. These studies and models provide important insight into the issues that 
may cause an auditor to breach their independence as well as attempt to validate some of 
the points of view regarding the auditor independence issue. 
DeAngelo (1981) provides one of the most fundamental inquiries into the auditor 
independence debate. Although DeAngelo's model is simplistic, it provides a basis for 
which other researchers have been able to improve upon, including academics in search 
of auditor independence with the provision of MAS. DeAngelo's model describes 
'lowballing', a practice that is commonly used to sell future audits. DeAngelo's model 
characterizes the intertemporal fee structure when incumbent auditors hold cost 
infonnation advantages over competing auditors. With this infonnation, incumbent 
auditors can earn client-specific quasi-rents. DeAngelo concludes that 'lowballing' does 
not impair auditor independence in itself and is simply a competitive practice forced by 
the conditions of the audit marketplace. 
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Magee and Tseng (1990) explored the interactions of audit pricing and 
independence by constructing a mUlti-period model of the audit market for a single client 
with the introduction of a reporting issue over which the auditor and the client may 
disagree. The authors begin by presenting a simple model of pricing in order to examine 
the amount of price-cutting and the value of incumbency. The model then has a reporting 
disagreement between the client and the auditor added, which is followed by an 
examination of conditions that produce auditor independence. Finally, sufficient 
conditions for a compromise of independence are identified. Magee and Tseng's simple 
model produces results that are similar to those found in DeAngelo's (1981) 'lowballing' 
model but more useful when considering the problem of independence. Magee and 
Tseng's study differs from DeAngelo's work by using a dynamic programming approach. 
Magee and Tseng also offer some interesting interpretations of their model. They 
propose that when all auditors agree that a reporting decision is consistent with proper 
application of GAAP, a positive incumbency value should not result in a compromise of 
independence. Furthermore, should auditors vary on consistency, it can be expected that 
auditors will not only begin competing on pricing, but on reporting as well. Finally, they 
conclude that established auditors with a wider client base could be expected to take a 
more conservative approach to the reporting dilemma. 
Antle and Demski (1991) studied the relationship between contracting frictions, 
regulation and the structure of CPA firms. Specifically they looked at the contracting 
frictions arising from the private information about the costs of providing auditing and 
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consulting services for clients. The authors claim that such information may result in 
economies of scope, whereas the client will be better off purchasing auditing and 
consulting services from the same firm. To provide support for this claim, they construct 
a model including the costs for bundling services and later add the effects of regulation. 
This model is unique because it holds constant the impact of auditor independence in 
order to study the economic efficiencies provided from allowing auditors to provide 
MAS. This study focuses on the implications on economies of scale and provides a valid 
argument for the allowance of MAS for audit clients. Antle and Demski conclude that 
economies of scope do exist based on an informational advantage held by the incumbent 
auditor. Antle and Demski also conclude that there is no benefit for having regulations 
for MAS in place. Regulations would generate a restriction of MAS and may force a 
change on the quantity of MAS purchased. 
Kanodia and Mukherji (1994) explore the issue of auditor turnover using a 
dynamic analysis. They utilize a static model of , low balling' that illustrates basic 
economic forces on equilibrium audit prices and make several assumptions contrary to 
DeAngelo's work. Their model assumes the client has bargaining power rather than the 
auditor, allows the client to sign one period contracts with auditors, and in the process of 
conducting the audit the auditor acquires private information on the recurring cost of 
auditing a client. The first assumption gives the client the ability to specify the price 
mechanism, while the second disallows the client from making long-standing contracts 
with auditors. The third assumption states that initially the client and all potential 
auditors have a range of costs for the audit. The authors claim that future information 
asymmetry is the main force underlying their analysis. Kanodia and Mukherji's study 
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differs from prior research by determining that client pressure is a less serious problem 
than illustrated in DeAngelo's (1981) work. They support this claim by incorporating 
two factors in their model. These factors require that the client not know the recurring 
cost of providing the audit and that the auditor's value of retaining a client is lower when 
the client holds the bargaining power. 
Simunic (1984) conducted a survey to analyze the decision to purchase MAS and 
audit services from the same provider. Simunic contrasted the arguments made by the 
Metcalf Committee and the Cohen Commission. Simunic characterized the Metcalf 
Committee's stance on MAS as a conflict of interest while the Cohen Commission's 
study failed to find any evidence of substandard audits. Simunic claims these two views 
imply the MAS debate can be reduced to a costlbenefit tradeoff where certain MAS 
possibly hinder auditor independence while overall the combination increases the audit 
quality. Simunic disputes that there is more to the problem than the costlbenefit tradeoff. 
Simunic claims the joint performance of services leads to the auditor receiving economic 
rents that cannot be transferred to equally profitable alternative uses as well as increasing 
the probability the auditor will report truthfully based on the argument that if the auditor 
is dismissed from auditing services, it stands a greater chance of losing any future MAS 
as well. The importance of the first point is not as clear as the second, but Simunic 
argues by giving an example of one firm that is earning economic rents with one that is 
not. The marginal benefits and costs of losing the client are indifferent to the firm not 
receiving economic rents, while Simunic points out the firm receiving rents will not want 
to be dismissed. 
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To test this stance, Simunic formed hypotheses that were further tested using fee 
data collected from publicly held companies in the U.S. The results were "(1) companies 
which purchased MAS from their auditors are similar (with respect to the [audit fees and 
other control variables]) to companies which did not purchase MAS from their auditors, 
(2) the purchase of MAS from the auditor is associated with a significant increase in the 
audit fee, and (3) the purchase of MAS from the auditor is not significantly associated 
with the cost of audit substitutes [such as better internal auditing] employed by the 
company" (p. 697-98). Simunic concludes that the management of firms used in his 
study were not better nor worse off financially or service provided wise for having 
purchased the MAS compared to other firms and also purchased MAS from their auditors 
because it maximized the value of the firm. 
Palmrose (1986) attempted to replicate Simunic's study. Her study investigated 
the effect of MAS on the pricing of audit services. She found evidence ofa strong 
positive relation between fees for audit services and fees for MAS and more specifically, 
that this relationship remained true whether or not the incumbent auditor was the supplier 
of the MAS. She claimed the widespread use ofincumbent auditors for MAS proved that 
clients perceived there was an advantage of to allowing the MAS to be provided by the 
incumbent auditor. 
Beck, Frecka, and Solomon (1988) extended Simunic (1984) and Palmrose (1986) 
by investigating the effects of MAS involvement on the tenure of auditors. Their study 
extended previous research by empirically testing the relationship between the auditor 
tenure and provider of MAS. The authors compared the tenure distribution of a sample 
of audit clients that had also purchased a high level of MAS with a control sample that 
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had not. The authors compared data compiled between 1969 and 1985. Over 82 percent 
of available subjects retained their same auditor during the eleven-year period 1969-79. 
Beck, Frecka, and Solomon hypothesize that the stronger the economic bond between 
client and auditor, the less auditor change can be found. The authors claim although 
statistically significant results were found, the average tenure on the auditee 
subpopulation implied that bonding effects formed by MAS are small when compared to 
other sources of bonding such as bonding associated with the audit. They concluded that 
auditor independence is not impaired substantially by the purchase of MAS services and 
reinforced the findings of previous work in this area. 
In a study sponsored by the Peat Marwick Foundation, Pany and Reckers (1988) 
questioned the previous research in the MAS area. Pany and Reckers characterize the 
profession's stance as being one of solely a perception problem rather than a lack of 
independence, since there is a lack of evidence provided by the government or 
academics. While the SEC seemed to agree with the profession, the members claim 
independence perceptions are critical in maintaining investor confidence and the integrity 
of financial reporting. It is this difference of opinion that has provided over twenty years 
of surveys and studies that seem to conclude the same basic premise of the independence 
perception problem. 
Pany and Reckers attempted to prove that the studies previously conducted 
had utilized methods that drove results. In general, increased performance of MAS had 
lead to a decreasing perception of independence in the past studies, which Pany and 
Reckers felt was due to the set up of the experiments. The authors conducted an 
experiment requiring loan officer subjects and financial analyst subjects to evaluate 
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information related to a potential common stock investment. Pany and Reckers 
administered several cases to these subjects that had manipulated the amount of MAS 
provided and required the subjects to assess there opinion on three questions. The 
questions asked how confident the user of the statements were that the statements were 
free of material fraud, how confident the user was that the statements had been prepared 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and their confidence level 
on whether the statements were free of material clerical errors. Their study contradicted 
past studies by concluding the provision of MAS leads to little or no effect on typical 
investment or credit granting decisions and perceptions. 
Scheiner (1984) questioned the impact of the SEC's requirement for firms to 
disclose non-audit services. The article focused on ASR No. 250 disclosure 
requirements, set up in 1978 and subsequently rescinded, in order to determine whether 
the requirement was repealed because it was found to be ineffective. This research 
provides valuable information even today in order to understand disclosure requirement 
rules. This is especially important due to the SEC recently requiring disclosure rules for 
MAS services. Scheiner's empirical assessment accumulated two years of data on non-
audit services in order to measure the amount of disclosure information and types on non-
audit services provided. Scheiner's study indicated the original rules set forth in ASR 
No. 250 did not appear to have a substantial impact on the amount of non-audit services 
provided by independent auditors, based on a unvaried provision of non-audit services by 
accounting firms. 
Dopuch and King (1991) used an experimental markets study towards 
understanding the impact of MAS on auditor independence. The authors claim this 
,-
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approach to the issue provides a directly observable approach, whereas past attempts to 
describe this issue have been indirect. The experimental settings were not created based 
on a formal model, but do encompass the essentials of a market, such as designing the 
market around fundamental transactions of sellers offering a dividend-paying asset. 
Twelve markets were set up with six markets having restrictions placed on auditors 
offering MAS and the other six with no restrictions. Auditors who chose not to acquire 
information on the client faced a reputation cost. A component was also built in for a 
negligence liability rule. In the experiment auditors also providing MAS shirked more in 
terms of collecting costly information, probably due to an increase in information 
provided by the MAS. The study concluded that auditors that provided MAS were more 
likely to shirk because their firm had provided the services, rather than verifying another 
firm's work. The study also provided evidence of no systematic patterns developing 
regarding clients rehiring their auditor. 
A second result of the Dopuch and King paper was a comparison of markets that 
restricted MAS from being provided with those markets that did not. Dopuch and King 
reasoned that markets with no restrictions were able to produce a single product 
consisting of auditing and MAS with one price. Markets that were held by restrictions 
found that some firms specialized in auditing while others specialized in MAS. Dopuch 
and King believe that should these restrictions be placed in the profession we should 
presume to see a similar separation and specialization among the auditing firms. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The auditor independence debate has raged for over twenty-five years with very 
little change since the original question was posed. The government has tapped 
numerous resources, throughout the history of the debate from the Metcalf Committee to 
the recent SEC inquiries, in an effort to find a solution agreeable to all parties. The 
profession has maintained auditor independence is the cornerstone of their business and 
that none would sacrifice this sacred principle. Academic research continues to search 
for theories where an auditor would violate independence, as well as provide theoretical 
evidence to support the various arguments for and against the provision of MAS. 
Academic models provide intriguing arguments for what conditions would lead to these 
violations. This debate seems to still be far from a final solution satisfactory for all 
parties. 
This study has provided an in-depth look at the auditor independence issue. A 
survey has been taken from governmental, professional, and academic literature in order 
to assess the current position of the debate and where future academic research should be 
devoted to in order to reach a solution among the consensus. The following suggestions 
have been provided in hopes that future research will answer these questions and lead to 
the economically efficient solution for this debate. 
One of the most important questions posed by this debate seems to be the value of 
independence in appearance. For the most part, the three communities believe that 
independence in fact is preserved and will continue to be preserved in the future. Some 
argue that independence in appearance remains vital to the profession in order to 
maintain investor confidence, as opposed to independence in fact which is necessary for 
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the audit market to exist. If this argument is true, then the question of will independence 
in appearance, once a hallmark of the profession, continue to serve a purpose in the 
future? Other economies, such as Great Britain, have abandoned this requirement in an 
effort to increase the efficiency of their economy. The U.S. Government should strongly 
consider abandoning its pursuit of both independence in appearance and fact in favor of 
independence in fact to allow for a more efficient economy. 
The difficulty of requiring independence in fact without independence in 
appearance lies in the transparency of independence in fact. While it is true that requiring 
independence in appearance may make it easier for observing independence in fact, it 
may also be damaging to the efficiency of the economy. The U.S. Government should 
not insist on the policy that is easier for them to regulate, but should instead focus on the 
policy that is most beneficial to society. 
Disallowing certain non-audit practices while allowing others would not only 
create confusion in the market for MAS, it would provide only a temporary solution to 
the ever-changing needs of the business community. The U.S. Government would be 
best served by not even considering this option as a way to regulate MAS. If such a plan 
of action was put in place, the laws should be written with a vagueness so as to allow 
room for interpretation. Even this course of action would monopolize much of the 
courts' time as they attempt to form case law, whereas a simple allowance of these MAS 
practices would promote economic efficiency by saving not only time but money as well. 
The profession may want to consider exactly where they stand on the issue of 
maintaining providing these services. They seem to be sending a mixed message when 
some of the larger firms spin off or sell their consulting work. This mixed message 
further complicates the auditor independence debate by adding a favorable argument to 
the U.S. Government's side. Standardization should be reached across the industry in 
order to maintain a unified stance in the face of the investing public and the U.S. 
Government. 
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Academics could help with this by attempting to discover the value of 
independence in appearance. They could utilize surveys to see what the investing public 
thinks about this issue. They could also apply models to determine theories of the value 
of independence in appearance to creditors and banks as well as search for any reasons 
why independence in appearance and fact would be preferred over independence in fact. 
These matters may help the profession advance and make a bigger contribution to 
society. 
With the increasing consciousness of globalization, the U.S. Government should 
consider the impact any changes in auditor independence would have. With the 
formation of international accounting regulating bodies the US. Government may want 
to consider taking a step towards a unified system and may allow MAS to be performed 
as they are in other countries. Restricting MAS would move the US. further away from 
meeting this possible goal. Academics should inteIject by studying and assessing 
whether a global accounting system could be feasible and at what point in time this could 
happen. 
Academics should continue to search for potential breaches in auditor 
independence in order to aid the U.S. Government in looking for failures. Evidence 
based on theoretical models would help the US. Government design regulations in order 
to monitor auditor independence. Although an easing of the debate over auditor 
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independence may allow other important questions to take precedence, an actual audit 
failures may devastate not only the profession, but would radically reverse any leniency 
the U.S. Government would allow. Models and studies will help prepare a monitoring 
system in order to preserve the integrity the profession has strived so hard to preserve as 
well as maintain confidence in the markets. 
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Table 1 
Metcalf Committee's Illustration of How the "Big Eight" Accounting 
Firms Maintain Control Over Accounting Standards 
The "Big Eight" Accounting Firms 
The "Big Eight" control the AICPA 
AICPA 
The AICPA Board of Directors has exclusive 
authority to elect and remove the members 
of the FAF Board of Trustees. 
Financial Accounting Foundation 
The FAF Board of Trustees has exclusive 
authority to appoint and remove the 
members of the FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
The FASB establishes accounting standards, as well as 
determining the procedures used to establish accounting 
standards. 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC officially recognizes accounting standards 
established by the FASB as the only standards which 
satisfy the requirements of the Federal securities laws 
The "Big Eight" Accounting Firms 
& Their Corporate Clients 
The "Big Eight" firms and their corporate clients, as well 
As other independent auditors and publicly-owned 
corporations, are required to use FASB accounting 
standards recognized by the SEC when reporting 
financial information to the public. 
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